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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NORTH UNION CANAL COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Vs .

Case No. 14238

DANIEL E. NEWELL and
RUTH I. NEWELL,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for an Order requiring Defendants
to remove a fence erected along a right-of-way acquired by
prescription by the Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the Court, and the Court found
Plaintiff's evidence insufficient to show that Plaintiff's easement has been interfered with by the Defendants.

From a Judgmenl

for the Defendants, Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Judgment and Judgment
requiring Defendants to remove the fence placed along Plaintiff
easement.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff has a prescriptive easement to convey water through the canal which runs through
Defendants1 property and acknowledge that Plaintiff has a right
to maintain and operate said canal.

Defendants acknowledge con-

struction of a fence adjoining the canal and two twelve-foot
gates allowing access to the canal bank (TR page 11, lines 24-26,
page 12, lines 10-12).

Defendants acknowledge a conversation

with Mr. Gillman regarding erection of the fence at a time when
Defendants were in the process of completing the fence and gates
in question.

(TR page 12, line 3).

;<; The witnesses produced at the trial all testified that
cleaning of the canal is performed by entering the canal through
the utilization of ramps provided for said purpose and driving
down the bottom of the canal with a truck and equipment and that
the banks of said canal are not utilized.

Mr. Newell (TR page 13,

lines 27-30); Mr. Gillman (TR page 23, lines 6-8; page 23, lines
11-20; page 24, lines 5-24); Mr. Swenson (TR page 45, lines 1-7;
page 46, lines 27-30; page 47, lines 1-6; page 47, lines 25-30;
page 48, lines 1-3); Mr

McKellar (TR page 62, lines 24-30);

Mr. Pratt (TR page 69, lines 21-25); also, Mr. Walker who had
actual knowledge of the cementing of said canal testified that
the cleaning was effectuated through the bottom of the canal
itself and that the cement was poured by utilizing the canal itself (TR page 35, lines 22-24; page 37, lines 20-26; page 39,
lines 20-30; page 40, lines 1-14)*
From the testimony of Mr. Swenson, it appears that
Plaintiff has avoided utilizing the Newell property consistently
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3because there are no head-gates in the area (TR page 45, lines
22-26) and that Plaintiff had utilized the bank of the canal
on Defendants' property for a limited number of times since
1951. (TR page 53, lines 19-30).
Plaintiff has never had unlimited ingress and egress
in regard to Defendants' property because of boundry fences
which go right to the very edge of Plaintiff's canal (TR page
74, lines 22-24; page 78).
Plaintiff's witnesses have testified that they would
not be unduly burdened by opening the gates provided by the
Defendants. (TR page 63, lines 26-30; page 64, lines 1-4; page
70, lines 6-12).
Defendants, by erecting the fence and gates in question, are attempting to utilize the property for a building lot
(TR page 76, lines 7-20) and to abolish a safety hazard which
has existed on Defendants' property. (TR page 73, lines 1-8).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW
THAT PLAINTIFF'S EASEMENT HAS BEEN, OR WILL BE
IN THE FUTURE, INTERFERED WITH BY THE ERECTION
OF A FENCE BY THE DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiff has not shown that the erection of a fence
on the west bank of Plaintiff's right-of-way by the Defendants
has interfered with the utilization of the right-of-way by the
Plaintiff.

It is not contended that Defendants have interfered

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4with the actual flow of water in the canal; rather, Plaintiff
is alleging that it should be entitled to an additional unrestricted easement along the banks of said canal for the purpose
of cleaning and maintenance.

However, Plaintiff's witnesses

have testified that the cement lining of the canal was originally installed by trucks and equipment entering the canal by permanent ramps and by pouring the cement from the bottom of the
canal. (TR page 35, lines 22^-25; page 37, lines 20-25).

All

of the witnesses have testified that the canal is cleaned by
equipment entering the canal through the utilization of ramps
provided at strategic points and then proceeding through the
bottom of the canal to effectuate the cleaning and maintenance
of the same, as shown in Respondents' Statement of Facts and
by Defendants' exhibits, numbers 25, 29, 30 and 36.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Lund v. Phillips Petroleum
Companyj 10 U. 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960) at page 954 stated:
To be sustainable in law the verdict need
only fall within that orbit so that it can
be said that there is substantial evidence
from which reasonable minds could believe
facts which will support it.
A general proposition regarding the sufficiency and
weight of evidence is stated at 30 Am Jur 2d Evidence, Sec. 1080,
page 226-22 7:

., ^ ti r

On the other hand, evidence is sufficient
or satisfactory if it is such as to satisfy
an unprejudiced mind of the truth, f
Testimony elecited on cross-examination must
be given force and effect along with other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-5evidence, and the interest of the witness
in the result of the trial, and his consequent bias, are matters to be considered, particularly if the witness' testimony
is uncorroborated or is contradicted by
other evidence.
As shown, the bottom of the canal is utilized by the Plaintiff
for cleaning and maintenance and not the banks.
The Supreme Court should not overturn the Trial
Courtfs Judgment unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against the Judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court in Weggeland v. tljifusa,
14 U. 2d 364, 384 P.2d 590 (1963), at page 591 held:
This being a case in equity, we sustain
the findings and determination made below
unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against them; or the court has misapplied
rules of law.
The Utah Supreme Court confirmed this statement in
In Re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 12 U. 2d 1,
361 P.2d 407 (1961).

There is clearly sufficient evidence for

the Trial Court to find that Defendants have not interfered
with Plaintiff's right-of-way.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO UTILIZE THEIR
PROPERTY IN ANY REASONABLE MANNER WITHOUT THE
:

APPELLANT'S CONSENT.
Merely because of the fact Appellant's easement was

established without a fence along the right-of-way does not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6mean that Respondents cannot utilize the servient estate. At
28 CJS Easements Sec. 90, the general proposition of law in
this regard is stated at page 770:
Unless he expressly agrees to the contrary,
the owner of the servient estate may use
his property in any manner and for any purpose consistent with the enjoyment of the
easement, and the owner of the dominant
estate cannot interfere with this use.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Stevens, et al. v. Bird-Jex
Co., 81 U. 355, 18 P.2d 292, (1933), adopts this statement at
page 295. Also, the Court in the Bird-Jex Case, Supra, at
page 294 states:
Ordinarily the grant of an easement over
land does not prevent the owner of the fee
from so using it as not to unreasonably
interfere with the special use for which
the easement was granted.
A general proposition of law regarding the fencing of
a right-of-way is set forth in 25 Am Jur 2d, Easements § Licenses
Sec* 89. page 495-496:
The owner of premises which are subject to
the easement of a way may or may not fence
along the way, as his convenience may dictate,
provided he does not obstruct the right of
passage.
The California Supreme Court in adopting this proposition of law, reserved every incident of ownership not inconsistent with the easement to the fee holder and in Dolske
v. Gormley, 25 Cal.Rptr. 270, 375 P.2d 174 (1962), at page 178
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-7stated:
Furthermore, the owner of the servient
estate may construct a fence long the
easement right of way so long as the
fence is not placed as to be inconsistent with the rights of the dominant
owner.
./•;
The Colorado Supreme Court in Fortner et al. v.
El Dorado Springs Resort

Co., et al.,

230 P. 386 (1924) has

gone even further in stating that a gate may be erected over
the actual right-of-way where there is a benefit to the fee
holder and only a slight inconvenience to the dominant estate.
In the above matter, gates have been erected to allow access,
if necessary; (TR page 64, lines 1-4; page 12, lines 10-12 )
Defendants1 exhibits 27 and 28). In the present case, there
has been no fencing of the actual easement, but merely the
boundry of said easement, and it appears that there is an
extremely

limited use of the area complained of by the Plain-

tiff (TR page 53, lines 19-30).
In the present case, there has been no obstruction
of the canal, but merely a fencing along the right-of-way and
an attempt to utilize the servient estate by the fee holder
(TR page 73, lines 1-8).
Appellant relies primarily on Holm v. Davis, et al.,
41 U. 200, 125 P.403, (1912) which can be distinguished from
the present action.

The Court, in the Holm's decision, held

that the owners of the dominant estate can enter the servient
estate to effectaute repairs and maintenance.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As shown by the

-8Statement of Facts, Respondents have never contested Appellantfs
right to enter the servient estate to effectuate repairs and
maintenance.

Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Bailey, et al., Ill U.

402, 181 P.2d 215 (1947) at page 216, relied upon by the Appellant, also holds that the dominant estate may enter upon the servient estate to make repairs and for maintenance and the Court
holds that there should be "•..no unnecessary injury to the
servient estate." Valley Development Co. v. Weeks, 364 P.2d
730 (1961), relied upon by the Appellant is not applicable because Respondents are not attempting to destroy a vested easement, being the utilization of the canal in question, but Respondents are only attempting to utilize the servient estate for
its most practical purpose.
lines 7-20).

(TR page 73, lines 1-8; page 76,

Also, the case of Robins v. Roberts, 80 U. 409

15 P.2d 340, (1932) relied upon by Plaintiff stated at page 342:
An easement acquired by prescription is
always limited to the use made during the
prescriptive period.
Appellant has not shown the required use on the property in
question. (TR page 53, lines 19-30; page 45, lines 24-26.)
Utah Code Annotated, Title 73-1-15, 1953 as amended, and relied
upon by Appellant is not applicable in this situation because
there has been no "...obstruction, or change of the water flow
by fence or otherwise..." Respondents have merely erected a
fence along the right-of-way. (TR page 11, lines 24-26).

This

also makes Appellant's illustration taken from 5 Reinstatement
Property, Sec.
510 Illustration 3 at page 3106 inapplicable beDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9cause there is no interference with the prescriptive easement,
merely a utilization of the servient estate by the fee owner.
Utah, by court decision, has adopted the policy that
the fee holder should be allowed to utilize the servient estate
for any lawful purpose as long as he does not interfere with
the actual easement.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Morris v. Blunt, et al.
49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916) recognized that the dominant estate
should interfere with the servient estate as little as possible
and at page 1133 stated:
In construing any grant of right of way the
use, in character and extent, is limited to
such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate and as little
burdensome to the servient estate as possible
for the use contemplated.
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in
Wade et al. v. Dorius, 52 U. 310 173 P. 564 (1918).

The Utah

Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Sandberg, 105 U. 93 141 P.2d 696,
(1943) coped with the question as outlined on page 701:
Can the water user who merely has an easement over land for conducting water through
a ditch impose limitations upon the use which
the land owner may make of his land?
The Utah Supreme Court, after extensive review of
other court decisions, stated at page 701:
The servient estate can only be subjected
to the easement to the extent to which the
easement was acquired, and the easement
owner
cannot
change
this
so BYU.
as to put
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben
Clarkuse
Law School,
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors.
any greater
burden
upon
the servient estate.

-10And as has been shown, the banks of Respondents' property are
not readily accessible because of boundry line fences. (TR
page 74, lines 22-24), and have been used only occasionally
by the Appellant. (TR page 45, lines 24-26; page 53, lines
19-30).

4

The Court also stated at page 701 and 702:
'Neither can the ditch owner so use his easement as to materially interfere with the
ordinary use of the land by the landowner.1
Kinney, Vol. II, Sec. 992. 'And in this
connection it may be stated that as a
general proposition, every man has a right
to the ordinary and natural use and enjoyment of his own property, and if while lawfully in such use and enjoyment, without
negligence or malice, a loss occurs to
his neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria,
for the rightful use of ones own land may
cause damage to the other without legal
wrong.'
The owner must likewise so use his easement as not to materially interfere with
the ordinary use of his land by the owner
of the servient estate. *** And, in the
absence of limitations imposed by contract,
or otherwise, the owner of the servient
estate has the undoubted right to use his
land according to the ordinary course of
husbandry, including the right to graze
his livestock thereon. He may without
negligence use it as 'similar land in the
vicinity is ordinarily used and for which
it is naturally fitted,' and repairs to
the ditch made necessary by such ordinary
use must be made by the ditch owner.
The following cases from other jurisdictions support

the idea upheld by the Utah Supreme Court that the fee owner can
utilize the servient estate for its usual or customary purpose
as long as the easement is not interfered with.

Dyer et al. v.

Compere, 41 N.M. 716 73 P.2d 1356 (1937) ; Hotchkiss v. Young,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-1171 P. 324 Supreme Court of Oregon, (1903); and Pioneer Irr.
Dist. v. Smith,, 48 Idaho 734,285 P. 474 (1930),
The Utah Supreme Court,in Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Co, v, Moyle, 109 U. 197, 174 P. 2d 148 (1946), recognized the
servient owner as owner of the fee and his rights subject only
to the reasonable use of the easement by the dominant estate.
The Court stated at page 157 and 158:
In the case at bar the purpose of the use
during the prescriptive period was to convey
water for irrigation across the defendants1
land.
Though the right to improve the ditches in
the interests of water conservation is within
the easement the irrigation company has across
defendants1 land it does not follow the company can exercise that right in any manner
it sees fit.
The rights of the dominant owner are limited
by the rights of the servient owner... Each
owner must exercise his rights so as not to
unreasonably interfere with the other...
The owners must have due regard for each
other and should exercise that degree of
care and use which a just consideration for
the rights of the other demands.***
It is elementary that the use of an easement must be as reasonable and as little
burdensome to the servient estate as the
nature of the easement and its purpose
will permit.
The servient owner is the owner of the fee and
as such has all the rights of the owner of
the fee subject only to the reasonable use
of the easement.
In the present matter, Respondents

have attempted to

obtain a balance of use by installing two twelve-foot gates (TR
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12-

page 12 lines 1-12) allowing access by the Appellant, if necessary.
The Court more recently in Weggeland v. Unifusa,
14 U 2d.364, 384 P. 2d 590, reaffirmed that an easement should
burden the servient estate only to the degree necessary to
satisfy the purposes of said easement.

The purpose of Appell-

ant's easement is to convey water across Respondents' property,
• r- ' -• '

'

[

and there has been no showing that Respondents have interfered
with this use.
The Appellant, by attempting to have the fence bordering the canal removed because of a possible use for such area
in the future (TR page 46), is attempting to unreasonably interfere with the fee owner's utilization of the servient estate,
contrary to the law which has been established in Utah.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court was correct in finding that Respondents1 fence did not interfere with the prescriptive easement
belonging to the Appellant for the conveyance of water across
Respondents' property.

Respondents, in this instance, are

merely attempting to utilize the servient estate for its
natural purpose, being that- of a building lot, and an attempt to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13eradicate a safety hazard to the neighborhood, which is allowed
under the law as established in Utah.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

GERALD M. CONDER
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
1305 J.C. Penney Building
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-0524
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